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<plb_layout val_1="S .244" val_2="Letzten Endes steht Coleman v. Miller für die Erkenntnis, dass einige Entscheidungen hinsichtlich „proposal“ und Ratifikation von Amendments ausschließlich dem Kongress vorbehalten sind – sei es angesichts des klaren Wortlauts der wesentlichen Bestimmung (Art.V) oder sei es aufgrund fehlender Entscheidungskriterien seitens der Gerichte, um abschließend und angemessen über Amendments zu befinden. &#13; " val_3="However, Coleman does stand as authority for the proposition that at least some decisions with respect to the proposal and ratifications of constitutional amendments are exclusively within the purview of Congress, either because they are textually committed to Congress or because the courts lack adequate criteria of determination to pass on them.[78] But to what extent the political question doctrine encompasses the amendment process and what the standards may be to resolve that particular issue remain elusive of answers.&#13; &#13; &#13; &#13; Fußnote im Text:&#13; [78] In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962), the Court, in explaining the political question doctrine and categorizing cases, observed that Coleman ''held that the questions of how long a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution remained open to ratification, and what effect a prior rejection had on a subsequent ratification, were committed to congressional resolution and involved criteria of decision that necessarily escaped the judicial grasp.'' Both characteristics were features that the Court in Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, identified as elements of political questions, e.g., ''a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards or resolving it.'' Later formulations have adhered to this way of expressing the matter. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973). However, it could be argued that, whatever the Court may say, what it did, particularly in Powell but also in Baker, largely drains the political question doctrine of its force. See Uhler v. AFLCIO, 468 U.S. 1310 (1984) (Justice Rehnquist on Circuit) (doubting Coleman's vitality in amendment context). But see Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (opinion of Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger) (relying heavily upon Coleman to find an issue of treaty termination nonjusticiable). Compare id. at 1001 (Justice Powell concurring) (viewing Coleman as limited to its context)." val_4="Onlinequelle (Woher genau ist nicht ersichtlich und erfodert noch eine genauere Recherche): " val_5="" val_6="" val_7="http://law.onecle.com/constitution/article-5/03-judicial-review-under-article-v.html" val_8="Bisher nur die Onlinequellen des Originaltextes gesichtet. " val_0="" val_cswikitext="" layout_id="1960" cswikitext=""></plb_layout>